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This paper analyses the influence of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity for 39 
countries during the period 1995-2012. The results reveal the importance of the 
dependence of firms on external finance and the banking structure of the countries on debt 
maturity during the financial crisis. Corporate debt maturity was found to decline during 
the financial crisis. However, only those firms that were more dependent on external 
finance before the onset of the financial crisis suffered this reduction. The reduction in 
corporate debt maturity is the result of a higher average increase in short-term debt than in 
long-term debt. The financial crisis had a stronger negative effect on corporate debt 
maturity in countries with less bank concentration, while the debt maturity of larger firms 
decreased less as a result of the financial crisis than the debt maturity of smaller firms in 
countries where banks play an important role in the financing of the private sector.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Global Financial Crisis is considered by many economists the worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. The current crisis has opened up an interesting debate 
regarding its consequences for the real economy. Financial institutions facing losses may 
reduce the availability of credit and increase the cost of accessing credit. During the financial 
crisis, this resulted in a credit crunch that played a crucial role in the failure of businesses, a 
decline in consumer wealth and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008-2012 
global recession and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis. An important strand 
of papers analysing the consequences of the financial crisis has focused on its influence on the 
lending channel. Most papers have shown that firm leverage and investment decreased as a 
consequence of the financial crisis. 
In this context, the aim of this paper is to study the impact of the current crisis on one aspect 
of capital structure, namely corporate debt maturity, analysing whether corporate debt 
maturity decreased as a result of the financial crisis in line with the imposition of more 
stringent credit conditions for borrowers. The paper also considers how dependence on 
external finance and country-level determinants influence the effect of the financial crisis on 
debt maturity. 
In contrast to the majority of previous papers analysing the impact of the financial crisis on the 
real economy, we consider the influence of the financial crisis within an international context1. 
Figure 1 shows the differences in the average ratio of long-term debt to total debt before and 
during the crisis for each country. The average ratio of long-term debt to total debt is 
calculated for the periods 1995-2007 and 2008-2012 for each country. Differences in debt 
maturity can be seen to vary widely across countries. For example, the average percentage of 
                                                          
1 Most of this literature has focused on the influence of the financial crisis within the US context 
(Almeida et al., 2011; Duchin et al., 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; and Santos, 2011, among 
others). The exception are the papers by Campello et al. (2010), Carvalho et al. (2015) and Lins et al. 
(2013), which analyse the impact of the crisis on real decisions made by corporations in an international 
context. 
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long-term debt for firms in South Korea, the USA and India decreased 7 per cent during the 
crisis compared to average values prior to 2008. However, the average percentage of long-
term debt increased sharply as a result of the financial crisis in countries such as Austria, 
Portugal and Brazil. In fact, the debt maturity of firms increased in more than half of the 
countries included in the sample. This evidence thus reveals that the variation in corporate 
debt maturity during the financial crisis may be affected by differences in country 
characteristics.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The contribution of the paper comprises the analysis of the influence of the financial crisis on 
debt maturity in a large cross-country panel of data for the period 1995-2012. We also study 
whether the effect of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity is affected by firm- and 
country-level determinants of debt maturity. In particular, we investigate whether this effect 
exists depending on the dependence of firms on external finance and on the banking structure 
of the country. First, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) and Duchin et al. (2010) provide evidence 
consistent with the bank lending supply shock being the origin of the reduction in performance 
or investment following banking crises. However, Kahle and Stulz (2013) show a decrease in 
borrowing and capital expenditures for US industrial firms that is not a consequence of a bank 
lending or credit supply shock. Within this context, we use the changes in corporate debt 
maturity during the crisis to investigate whether these changes are in line with a credit supply 
or a demand effect. Second, as the financial crisis had an important impact on the solvency of 
banks, the weight of bank credit in the financing of the private sector and bank concentration 
might influence the credit standards set by banks. We are not aware of any other study that 
has investigated the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on corporate debt maturity within an 
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international context2. Almeida et al. (2011) test whether US firms with large fractions of their 
long-term debt maturing at the time of the crisis present more pronounced negative outcomes 
than otherwise similar firms. Firms whose long-term debt was maturing right after the onset of 
the crisis cut their investment rates more than other firms did. However, these authors do not 
analyse the effect of financial crisis on corporate debt maturity or how firm and country 
characteristics influence the effect of the financial crisis on debt maturity. 
The findings of the present paper are consistent with a small reduction in corporate debt 
maturity as a result of the financial crisis. However, this result conceals differences according 
to firm dependence on external finance and institutional features of the countries. Our 
findings show that the financial crisis had a negative effect on corporate debt maturity for 
those firms with a greater dependence on external finance and in countries with lower levels 
of efficiency of the legal system and bank concentration. We thus show that the variation in 
corporate debt maturity during the financial crisis is consistent with a credit supply shock, as 
only firms that have more dependence on external finance suffered reductions in debt 
maturity following the onset of the crisis. Furthermore, our results reveal that bank 
concentration helped to reduce the negative impact of the financial crisis on corporate debt 
maturity. This result is consistent with the idea that firms in less concentrated credit markets 
are subject to greater financial constraints (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berlin and Mester, 1999) 
and in keeping with the benefits of relationship banking. However, the negative effect of the 
financial crisis on corporate debt maturity was greater in countries where the weight of banks 
in the economy is significant, affecting mainly smaller firms. Finally, our results are robust to 
the use of alternative measures of the financial crisis and reveal that the effect of the crisis on 
corporate debt maturity was greater during the period 2010-2011. We also provide evidence 
                                                          
2 Deesomsak et al. (2009) investigate the effects of firm-specific and country-specific characteristics and 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the debt maturity structure of firms in the Asia Pacific region (Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Australia), comparing the consequences of the crisis for these four countries. 
Their paper reveals that the crisis had several significant effects on both firm-specific and market-wide 
determinants of debt maturity, especially in Thailand and Malaysia, where the crisis originated. 
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that the effect of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity depends on the intensity of 
the financial crisis. In fact, firms in those countries where the decline in economic activity or 
the percentage of nonperforming loans are higher present a greater reduction in debt 
maturity. 
The rest of the paper presents a review of the literature and discusses the implications tested 
in Section 2, while Section 3 describes the database and methodology employed. Section 4 
discusses the empirical results and Section 5 provides robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Global Financial Crisis has opened up a debate regarding its consequences for the real 
economy. In this context, several papers have analysed the impact of the financial crisis on the 
lending channel. Chari et al. (2008) call into question the way in which the financial crisis has 
affected the economy, showing that the crisis is not associated with a decline in bank lending. 
However, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that syndicated lending started to decline in 
mid-2007 and fell sharply during the bank panic that began in September 2008 for US firms3. 
They also highlight that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their lines 
of credit, leading to an increase in loans reported on bank balance sheets. Their paper also 
shows that some banks were more adversely affected than others were. In fact, banks with 
more deposit financing cut their syndicated lending less than banks without access to this 
more stable source of funding.  
                                                          
3 The bank lending survey by the European Central Bank (ECB) shows that the financial crisis also 
reduced the credit issued by banks in European countries. This survey is addressed to senior loan officers 
of a representative sample of euro area banks and is conducted four times a year. The sample group 
participating in the survey comprises around 90 banks from all euro area countries and takes into account 
the characteristics of their respective national banking structures. Detailed information on the survey and 
results are available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html.  
6 
 
Evidence has not only revealed that lending has reduced as a consequence of the crisis, but 
that it has also led to an increase in borrowing costs and changes in investment decisions. 
Santos (2011) shows that firms paid higher loan spreads during the subprime crisis and that 
the increase in loan spreads was higher for firms which borrowed from banks that incurred 
greater losses. In a survey of 1,050 CFOs, Campello et al. (2010) find that more than half the 
respondents cancelled or postponed their planned investments because of financial 
constraints during the crisis. Furthermore, their evidence indicates that constrained firms 
report significantly larger planned percentage cuts compared to their peers in technology and 
capital spending and employment. Carvalho et al. (2015) show that the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis is associated with equity valuation losses and investment cuts to borrower firms with the 
strongest lending relationships with banks. Almeida et al. (2011) reveal that US firms whose 
long-term debt was largely maturating immediately after the third quarter of 2007 cut their 
investment-to-capital ratio more than other similar firms whose debt was due well after the 
crisis. Duchin et al. (2010) also reveal that corporate investment by US firms declined 
significantly following the onset of the financial crisis and this decline was greater for firms 
dependent on external finance. In line with this evidence, Vermoesen et al. (2013) report that 
Belgium firms which, at the start of the crisis, had a larger part of their long-term debt 
maturing within the next year experienced a significantly larger drop in investments in 2009. 
Moreover, this effect was mainly driven by firms which are more likely to be financially 
constrained. Lins et al. (2013) show that family-controlled firms underperformed significantly 
compared to other firms during the global financial crisis using a sample of 8,584 firms from 35 
countries. All the above evidence thus reveals the important effects of the financial crisis on 
the lending channel, providing support for the existence of significant supply constraints in 
terms of both quantity and the price of the credit leading to reductions in investment rates. 
In this context, the present paper analyses the influence of the recent financial crisis on 
corporate debt maturity. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Campello et al. (2012) reveal that 
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credit lines became particularly important during the first quarters of the financial crisis, as 
they replaced bank loans, providing the liquidity needed to invest during the crisis and 
ameliorating the negative impact of scarce credit on real activities. As most credit lines have a 
shorter maturity than bank loans (Jimenez et al., 2007)4, we expect the financial crisis to be 
associated with a shortening of corporate debt maturity. Moreover, the imposition of more 
stringent credit standards by banks, substituting long-term loans by shorter loans due to the 
solvency problems suffered by banks, may also lead to a reduction in debt maturity. 
Consequently, our first hypothesis is: 
H1. The financial crisis has reduced corporate debt maturity as a result of the use of shorter 
debt. 
However, we expect the influence of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity not to have 
an equally detrimental effect on all firms and that the observed differences in debt maturities 
will depend on the dependence on external finance and on the structure of the banking 
system in each economy.  
The influence of financial crises on corporate borrowing and investment may be explained 
from two alternative theories. On the one hand, credit supply shock theory poses that the 
credit system does not renew loans as a response to a shock in the financial system5 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). According to this view, debt issuance and 
corporate investment should fall more for credit-dependent firms. On the other hand, the 
effect of the financial crises on the real economy could be the result of a demand shock (Kahle 
and Stulz, 2013). According to this theory, increases in uncertainty and decreases in the 
demand for products following financial crises lead to a decrease in investment and hence in 
demand for credit to finance investment. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) offer evidence that there is a 
                                                          
4 Campello et al. (2012) find that the maturity of credit lines in their sample for European and US firms is 
about 30 months before the crisis, while it is about 27 months during the crisis (2008-2009). 
5 A more specific theory is the bank supply shock theory, in which banks are the ones that reduce the 
supply of loans as a result of a shock in the financial system. 
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real cost to banking crises, as sectors that are more dependent on external finance perform 
relatively worse during banking crises. Duchin et al. (2010) also provide evidence in line with a 
credit supply shock, as the decline in corporate investment following the recent financial crisis 
is higher for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short-term debt, are financially 
constrained or operate in industries dependent on external finance. However, Kahle and Stulz 
(2013) show evidence that is not in line with the view that a bank lending supply shock or a 
credit supply shock constitute predominant casual factors to explain the financial and 
investment policies of firms during the recent crisis. In this context, our second hypothesis is 
the following: 
H2. The reduction in debt maturity would be higher for firms with a greater dependence on 
external finance before the crisis if credit supply shock is the dominant effect. 
Access to external financing will partly depend on the banking structure of each economy. 
Banks are central to business activity, as they are the main providers of debt financing in most 
economies. Financial intermediaries directly influence corporate financial structure. They have 
advantages in collecting information (Diamond, 1984) and incentives to use this information to 
discipline borrowers due to the fact that they benefit from economies of scale in obtaining 
information and do not suffer from free-rider problems. 
Specifically, we consider that the banking structure of the country might influence the effect of 
the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity. Fan et al. (2012) report a negative effect of the 
weight of banks in the economy on debt maturity as a result of bank preferences for short-
term debt. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) also stress that short-term debt allows 
banks to use their advantages in monitoring borrowers. Short-term debt forces lenders to 
monitor corporate performance more frequently and enables the bank to change the terms of 
contract or not to renew the loan (Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992). Large firms have better access 
to domestic and international markets and are therefore usually less dependent on domestic 
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bank credit. However, as they are subject to more financing constraints, smaller firms will be 
affected to a greater extent by bank preferences. Consequently, we expect a negative 
relationship between the weight of banks in the economy and corporate debt maturity, 
particularly in the case of smaller firms. We forecast that this negative relationship will be 
stronger during the financial crisis, as bank difficulties lead banks to lend on a shorter-term 
basis, replacing long-term by short-term debt. In line with the above arguments, our third 
hypothesis is: 
H3. The weight of bank credit in the financing of the private sector had a more negative effect 
on corporate debt maturity during the financial crisis, especially in the case of smaller firms. 
The banking literature suggests that bank concentration has two potential effects on firm 
leverage. In a market without asymmetric information, there will be a negative relationship 
between bank concentration and firm leverage given that higher bank market power results in 
a higher price for debt and less credit availability. However, in markets with asymmetric 
information, higher bank market concentration may increase the incentives of banks to invest 
in the acquisition of soft information by establishing close relationships with borrowers over 
time. This will lead to greater availability of credit, thus reducing corporate financial 
constraints (Boot, 2000; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). 
The importance of bank concentration has been argued by Petersen and Rajan (1995) and 
Berlin and Mester (1999). These authors show that US firms in less concentrated credit 
markets are subject to greater financial constraints. They offer evidence from small business 
data indicating that creditors are more likely to finance credit-constrained firms when credit 
markets are concentrated because it is easier for these creditors to internalize the benefits of 
assisting firms. More recently, Bharath et al. (2011) show the benefits of borrowing from 
relationship lenders even for large firms with a much wider choice of financing options 
available. The existence of a positive relationship between bank concentration and credit 
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availability is in line with the fact that relationship banking serves to mitigate information 
asymmetries between creditors and debtors. Given that long-term debt is subject to greater 
information asymmetries than short-term debt, the positive effect of bank concentration on 
leverage could be concentrated in long-term debt. Thus, a positive relationship might be 
assumed between bank concentration and debt maturity. From this point of view, the financial 
crisis could have a weaker effect on corporate debt maturity because of the benefits of 
relationship banking in those countries where bank concentration is higher, seeing as 
increased competition is likely to erode the benefits of relationship lending. However, given 
that the financial crisis has affected the solvency of banks, it could also result in the rupture of 
bank-firm relationships. As both types of relation are theoretically possible, we make no a 
priori forecast as to whether relationship banking has increased or decreased as a result of the 
financial crisis, treating it as an empirical issue. 
3. DATABASES, METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLES 
Our source for firm data is the Worldscope database, which contains financial statement data 
and stock prices from many countries in comparable form. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000 - 
6999) were excluded. Finally, our sample comprises 30,727 firms and 171,892 firm-year 
observations for 39 countries over the period 1995-2012. The sample includes countries with 
different institutional environments.  
We use the following benchmark model to investigate the aggregate effect of the recent 
financial crisis on the debt maturity structure of firms: 
iti
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The dependent variable is debt maturity (DEBT_MAT); defined as the percentage of the firm’s 
total debt that has a maturity of more than one year. DCRISIS is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, and zero otherwise. Our interest 
is focused on the coefficient of the DCRISIS variable and on the interaction of this variable with 
the firm’s dependence on external finance and the country’s banking structure. We therefore 
introduce interaction terms of the crisis dummy with the dependence of external finance and 
with the country variables considered in our benchmark model. 
To analyse the influence of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity, we control for the 
differences in the sample in terms of firm and country characteristics. We first control for the 
differences in the sample in firm characteristics. To do so, we introduce firm-level variables 
suggested by theory which have been used in previous studies analysing firm debt maturity 
(Myers, 1977; Barnea et al., 1980; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Guedes 
and Opler, 1996; Ozkan, 2000; Scherr and Hulburt, 2001; and Antoniou et al., 2006). These 
variables include asset maturity (ASSET_MAT), growth opportunities (GROWTH), firm size 
(SIZE), firm quality (FIRM_QUALITY), earnings volatility (VOL_EBIT) and leverage (LEV). Our 
proxy measures of these determinants are constructed in line with the empirical literature on 
corporate debt maturity. Appendix A presents the definitions of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis and their sources. 
Second, identifying the impact of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity requires 
controlling for changes in country characteristics. The papers by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) and Fan et al. (2012) reveal that the institutional context influences 
corporate debt maturity. Our estimations accordingly include proxies for country determinants 
of debt maturity. Following the aforementioned papers, these variables are rule of law 
(RULE_OF_LAW), protection of investors’ rights (C_RIGHTS and S_RIGHTS) and the weight of 
banks in the economy (BANK_CREDIT). In line with the potential effect of relationship banking 
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on corporate debt maturity, we also include bank concentration (BANK_CONC). As corporate 
debt maturity might also depend on the issuance of corporate bonds, we include a proxy of 
the firms’ dependence on bond issues (BOND). This variable controls for potential substitution 
effects between bank debt and corporate bonds6. In countries where the corporate bond 
market is sufficiently developed and firms are less dependent on bank loans, the effect of the 
financial crisis on corporate debt maturity might depend on the evolution of bond markets 
during the crisis. 
We have used the rule of law component from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2009) to proxy the efficiency of a country’s legal system. Rule of 
law is one of the six dimensions of the WGI and captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence (RULE_OF_LAW). The index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, low levels denoting a less efficient 
legal system. 
We use the index developed in Djankov et al. (2007) to measure the legal rights of creditors 
against defaulting debtors (C_RIGHTS). This index is a development of the creditors’ rights 
index proposed by La Porta et al. (1998), although the creditors’ rights index is constructed in 
January each year in the former paper. It measures four powers of secured lenders in 
bankruptcy: (1) whether there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, when a debtor files 
for reorganization; (2) whether secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the 
petition for reorganization is approved, i.e. whether there is no automatic stay or asset freeze 
imposed by the court; (3) whether secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of 
liquidating a bankrupt firm; and (4) whether an administrator, and not management, is 
responsible for running the business during the reorganization. A value of one is added to the 
                                                          
6 De Fiore and Uhlig (2014) show that non-financial corporations started shifting the composition of their 
debt from bank loans towards debt securities early in 2008. 
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index when a country’s laws and regulations provide each one of these powers to secured 
lenders. It consequently ranges between 0 and 4, with higher values indicating stronger 
creditors’ rights or stronger protection against borrower expropriation. 
We measure the protection of property rights by means of the index of private property rights 
(S_RIGHTS) published by the Heritage Foundation. This is an annual index of the degree to 
which private property rights are protected and the degree to which government enforces 
laws that protect private property. It also accounts for the possibility that private property may 
be expropriated, as well as analysing the independence of the judiciary, corruption within the 
judiciary and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. This index ranges 
between 0 and 100, a high score indicating greater legal protection of property rights. 
We use two variables to proxy the country’s banking structure. First, the weight of banks in the 
economy, measured as the annual ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
(BANK_CREDIT). The data are obtained from the Financial Structure and Economic Database 
(Beck et al., 2006). Second, we also use a measure of bank concentration in a country. 
Following Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2006), we measure bank concentration 
as the annual fraction of bank assets held by the three largest commercial banks in the country 
(BANK_CONC). Figures are obtained from the World Bank Database, whose main source is 
Fitch IBCA’s Bankscope Database. We control for the development of the bond market, 
measured annually as the sum of the private bond market capitalization to GDP plus the 
international debt issues to GDP (BOND).  
A potential problem when considering banking structure and the development of private bond 
market proxies is that these variables can themselves be affected by the development of other 
institutions or by corporate financing decisions. We resolve this question regarding the 
potential endogeneity of these variables using instrumental variables estimation. We consider 
several variables as instruments of the weight of banks and bonds in the economy and bank 
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concentration. The proxies for the role of banks and bonds in the financing of firms in each 
economy are: rule of law, the protection of creditor rights, the legal origin of the country, per 
capita GDP, the sum of short-term and long-term capital flows plus foreign direct investment 
into the country divided by GDP and the average firm size in each country (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999). Similarly, we regress the observed value of bank concentration on the 
institutional quality of the country measured by the protection of property rights, on the legal 
origin of the country and on the market size proxied by the country’s total population and total 
GDP (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001). Subsequently, we perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) 
test of overidentifying restrictions for each of the regressions. This test verifies the null 
hypothesis that the introduction of instrumental variables has no influence on the coefficients 
of the estimations. We hence perform a DWH F test for each of the estimations in our paper, 
the results of which are reported in the bottom row of each table. When the p value of the F 
test falls below 10 percent, the null hypothesis is rejected and the instrumental variables 
estimations are reported. Otherwise, the estimations with the observed values of the banking 
structure variables are provided. 
We include three specific effects: country-year (
kt
kt ), industry-year (
jt
jt ) and firm-
specific ( i ) effects. These specific effects aim to control for most of the shocks affecting debt 
maturity. This approach has the advantage of being less likely to suffer from omitted variable 
bias or model specification than traditional regressions (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008). 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the firm- and country-level variables used in this 
paper, dividing the sample into the periods “before the crisis” and “during the crisis”. Panel A 
describes the entire 1995-2012 period, while Panels B and C show the descriptive statistics 
before (1995-2007) and during (2008-2012) the crisis. Debt maturity can be seen to decrease 
during the crisis from a mean value of 49.09 per cent to a mean value of 44.58 per cent. This 
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result is thus consistent with the financial crisis shortening corporate debt maturity as per our 
prediction. However, this analysis does not take into account potentially significant differences 
in firm- and country- level characteristics resulting from the financial crisis. As for firm control 
variables, asset maturity, growth opportunities, size and firm quality are seen to decrease 
during the crisis, while only volatility of earnings and leverage show an increase as a 
consequence of the crisis. Bank concentration and the role of banks and bond markets in the 
financing of the private sector increased during the crisis. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 reports the number of observations for each country and the mean values of country-
level variables for each country. Debt maturity varies widely among countries: Thailand has the 
lowest level of long-term debt (32.84 per cent), while the US has the highest percentage of 
long-term debt (73.10 per cent). There are also important differences in terms of the efficiency 
of the legal system, protection of investors’ rights, bank concentration, the weight of banks in 
the economy or the issuance of corporate bonds in each country. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. DEBT_MAT shows a positive correlation with asset 
maturity, growth opportunities, size, leverage, rule of law, protection of property rights and 
development of the private bond market, but correlates negatively with firm quality, volatility 
of earnings, protection of creditor rights, bank concentration and the weight of banks in the 
economy. As noted previously, corporate debt maturity also correlates negatively with 
DCRISIS. In general, the correlations among firm-level variables are low.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
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The estimations are carried out using panel data. Prior to testing, we used the Breusch-Pagan 
test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) to identify the existence of individual effects. The null 
hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity is rejected. In this context, a model that captures 
individual heterogeneity, as the panel data methodology does, is appropriate. The panel data 
methodology corrects for unobserved firm-specific and time-specific effects. The panel data 
estimation was calculated using fixed effects, as the Hausman test (1978) rejects the null 
hypothesis of the lack of correlation between individual effects and observable variables in all 
regressions. All independent firm-level variables are lagged by one year to control for potential 
problems of endogeneity. 
Table 4 presents the results from the panel data estimation. Column (1) shows the results 
when considering firm-level determinants of debt maturity and the DCRISIS variable. First, the 
coefficient of DCRISIS is negative and significant, revealing that the debt maturity of firms 
decreased during the period of financial crisis. In fact, the coefficient of DCRISIS in column (1) 
shows that firms reduced their debt maturity by 1 per cent on average during the financial 
crisis after considering firm-level determinants of debt maturity. This effect is lower when we 
also include country-level determinants. According to the results obtained in column (2), this 
reduction is just 0.42 per cent and is not significant, suggesting that the financial crisis had a 
detrimental, but non-significant effect on corporate debt maturity.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Analysis of the results for the firm control variables shows that debt maturity is positively 
related to asset maturity. This is consistent with the matching hypothesis, according to which 
firms match assets and liabilities in order to reduce risk. The GROWTH variable shows a 
positive and significant coefficient, a result that is inconsistent with the agency cost 
hypothesis. Although the underinvestment problem identified by Myers (1977) suggests that 
debt maturity should decrease with growth opportunities, the empirical findings of Stohs and 
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Mauer (1996) are also in line with a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
debt maturity. This positive relationship between growth opportunities and corporate debt 
maturity could be supported by the liquidity risk argument, according to which firms with long-
term investment opportunities prefer to hedge against liquidity risk by issuing long-term debt 
(Antoniou et al., 2006; Diamond, 1991; Guedes and Opler, 1996). The effect of size on debt 
maturity is positive, indicating that larger firms have longer debt maturities. This relationship is 
consistent with the idea that firms with greater agency problems, i.e. small firms, may use 
shorter-term debt to reduce underinvestment and risk-shifting problems. FIRM_QUALITY has a 
negative influence on debt maturity, indicating that high-quality firms tend to issue short-term 
debt as the incentives to lengthen the maturity of debt increases with the risk of not being 
able to refund debt. The coefficient of VOL_EBIT is negative, though not statistically significant 
at standard levels; hence, we do not obtain evidence in line with the tax hypothesis. According 
to this hypothesis, the maturity of debt should rise when the volatility of firm value decreases. 
This is because firms with high volatility in their value have to change their capital structure 
frequently to reduce bankruptcy costs and will hence use more short-term debt (Kane et al., 
1985). Leverage shows a positive relationship with debt maturity in a way that is consistent 
with the arguments put forward by Diamond (1991), as liquidity risk increases with leverage 
and hence highly leveraged firms can be expected to use more long-term debt. Moreover, this 
effect dominates the use of leverage and debt maturity as substitutes in mitigating under- and 
overinvestment problems. 
To sum up, we find strong evidence that the firm characteristics that have been found to affect 
debt maturity in the existing literature are also relevant for the firms in our sample. As regards 
the firm-level control variables, our results thus provide strong evidence in line with the 
matching maturity and liquidity risk explanations. 
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Column (2) shows the results when the country-specific determinants are considered. All the 
results for firm-specific variables discussed previously are maintained when the country-level 
determinants of debt maturity are included in the estimations. The RULE_OF_LAW variable has 
a positive coefficient, indicating that firms in countries with strong legal enforcement have 
longer debt maturity. However, this coefficient is not found to be statistically significant. This 
lack of significance of the RULE_OF_LAW variable could be explained by its high correlation 
with S_RIGHTS7. Consequently, we exclude the S_RIGHTS variable in column (3). In spite of the 
results being similar for RULE_OF_LAW when the S_RIGHTS variable is excluded, the proxy for 
the protection of property rights is excluded from the estimations in the rest of the paper and 
RULE_OF_LAW is considered as a proxy of the enforcement of law and the protection of 
property rights.  
The level of protection of creditor rights (C_RIGHTS) is seen to positively influence corporate 
debt maturity. Firms in countries with strong protection of creditors’ rights tend to issue debt 
with a longer maturity. Stronger creditor protection gives lenders more power during 
bankruptcy. Besides, a greater ability to force repayment will exert an ex ante influence on the 
terms of the credit. This increases the recovery rate of loans and reduces the risk to lenders. 
Moreover, stronger protection of creditors’ rights reduces the likelihood of firms engaging in 
excessive risk taking and asset substitution. The positive relationship between the protection 
of creditors’ rights and corporate debt maturity suggests that creditors lend on more 
favourable terms when their rights are strongly protected and is consistent with the evidence 
provided by Qian and Strahan (2007) for bank loans.  
As far as the banking structure variables are concerned, the maturity of debt is seen to 
increase in countries in which bank concentration (BANK_CONC) is high. This result suggests 
                                                          
7 In fact, the measure of the efficiency of the legal system (RULE_OF_LAW) considers not only the 
quality of contract enforcement, but also the protection of property rights, while the measure of protection 
of property rights (S_RIGHTS) also takes into account the degree to which government enforces laws. 
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that higher bank concentration increases bank incentives to establish close relationships with 
borrowers over time, thus reducing the financial constraints on firms. It is consistent with the 
findings of Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant (2008), who show that stronger firm-bank 
relationships lengthen the maturity of bank loans for a sample of small and medium-sized 
European enterprises. 
The weight of banks in the economy (BANK_CREDIT) is seen to have a negative influence on 
debt maturity. This result is in line with the evidence provided by Fan et al. (2012). These 
authors obtained a negative relationship between the weight of banks in the economy and 
debt maturity, which is consistent with the preferences of suppliers of capital having an 
influence on debt maturity structures. As for the development of the private bond markets, we 
show that it has a positive effect on corporate debt maturity, in line with the longer maturity 
of bonds than bank loans. 
Following Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) and Duchin et al. (2010), we assume that the debt maturity 
of firms which were more dependent on external finance before the onset of the crisis is more 
likely to be affected by the supply effect of the crisis. Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4 report the 
analysis of the changes in debt maturity in more financially dependent firms. We define a new 
variable, DCRISIS*FD, which is the interaction term between the DCRISIS variable and the ratio 
of debt and total assets at December 2006 (FD). The coefficient of this interaction term 
(DCRISIS*FD) will be the differential effect of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity for 
those firms with a greater dependence on external finance before the onset of the crisis. A 
negative coefficient of DCRISIS*FD would suggest that corporate debt maturity decreased 
more in more financially-dependent firms as a consequence of the recent financial crisis and 
would be the expected result if the reduction in corporate debt maturity were caused by a 
credit supply shock. 
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The coefficients of the interaction terms between the variable identifying the crisis years 
(DCRISIS) and the firms’ external dependence (FD) are negative and statistically significant at 
conventional levels regardless of whether we control for firm-level characteristics or whether 
we also control for country-level determinants of corporate debt maturity. Thus, evidence 
consistent with the existence of a credit supply effect on corporate debt maturity following the 
recent financial crisis is provided. 
The results for the DCRISIS variable in columns (4) to (6) in fact reveal the existence of a 
positive effect of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity for those firms that depended 
less on external finance before the onset of the crisis, as the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at standard levels. The coefficients in columns (5) and (6) show that 
firms that were less dependent on external finance increased their debt maturity by 1.25-1.29 
per cent on average during the financial crisis. The coefficients and their significance for the 
remaining explanatory variables, i.e. firm- and country-level variables, are similar to those we 
found previously. Thus, the results are maintained when we consider whether a credit supply 
effect exists or not in corporate debt maturity. 
Table 5 shows the results when we investigate the way in which the financial crisis influenced 
corporate debt maturity. We consider three different dependent variables, the ratios between 
total debt (columns (1) and (2)), long-term debt (columns (3) and (4)), and short-term debt 
(columns (5) and (6)) and the market value of assets8. The market value of assets is defined as 
total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. By using these 
three measures of leverage as dependent variables, we aim to better understand the effect of 
the recent financial crisis on corporate debt maturity. As firm-level control variables, we use 
the traditional determinants of firms’ capital structure indicated by Rajan and Zingales (1995): 
profitability, growth opportunities, asset tangibility and firm size. We measure profitability 
                                                          
8 Welch (2004) argues that we should use market leverage ratios given that theories of target ratios are 
implicitly about market leverage ratios. 
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(PROFITABILITY) as earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses and 
provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets. We use the market-to-
book ratio, as in Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Flannery and Rangan (2006), as a measure of 
growth opportunities (GROWTH). Following Titman and Wessels (1988), we proxy the 
tangibility of assets by the percentage of property, plant and equipment in total assets 
(TANGIBILITY). We use the natural logarithm of total sales (SIZE) as the measure of firm size. 
We also control for the protection of creditors’ rights (C_RIGHTS) using the index developed in 
Djankov et al. (2007), as the papers by Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Giannetti 
(2003) and González and González (2008) show that institutions that favour creditors’ rights 
and ensure stricter enforcement are associated with higher leverage. Additionally, we include 
DCRISIS to determine how the crisis affected leverage and DCRISIS*FD to investigate whether 
the credit supply effect may explain the observed variation in corporate debt structure or not 
during the financial crisis. 
The coefficients of the firm-level control variables are as expected. The coefficient of 
PROFITABILITY is negative for total and short-term leverage. This finding is in line with the 
pecking order theory, as higher profitability increases the possibility of retaining earnings, thus 
reducing the use of debt. The negative coefficients for growth opportunities reflect higher 
agency costs between shareholders and debtholders and higher costs of financial distress. The 
positive coefficients of TANGIBILITY in all the estimations are consistent with the greater value 
of these assets as collateral. Firm size has a positive impact on the total and long-term debt of 
firms, which is consistent with size being an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. 
The positive coefficients for C_RIGHTS confirm that legal protection of creditor rights can 
reduce the agency cost of debt, as reported by Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), 
Giannetti (2003) and González and González (2008). 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
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The significant and positive coefficients of DCRISIS in column (1) reveal that leverage increased 
during the financial crisis. Columns (3) and (5) respectively show the variation in long-term and 
short-term debt leverage ratios during the recent crisis. The results also reveal an increase in 
long- and short-term debt as a result of the crisis, the increase being higher for short-term 
debt. The coefficients of DCRISIS in columns (3) and (5) show that firms respectively increased 
the ratios of long- and short-term debt and the market value of assets by 1.86 and 2.55 per 
cent on average during the financial crisis. 
The coefficients of the interaction terms between the DCRISIS variable and the firms’ external 
dependence (FD) are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels regardless of 
whether the dependent variable is total, long- or short-term leverage. These negative 
coefficients of DCRISIS*FD reveal that there is a negative differential effect of the financial 
crisis on corporate leverage for those firms that depended more on external finance before the 
onset of the recent crisis, providing evidence of a credit supply effect in corporate leverage. 
Furthermore, short-term leverage is seen to increase more for less financially-dependent firms 
and to decrease less for more financially-dependent firms compared to long-term leverage in 
these groups of firms. These results suggest that the effect of the recent crisis on corporate 
maturity shown in Table 4 is caused by higher average increases in short-term debt than long-
term debt. 
The debt maturity regressions in Table 6 show that the effect of the financial crisis on debt 
maturity is related to institutional and banking structure characteristics. Columns (1) to (5) 
present the results when the interactions between DCRISIS and the country-level 
characteristics considered in this paper are included sequentially in the specification. The 
coefficients of RULE_OF_LAW, C_RIGHTS, BANK_CONC, BANK_CREDIT and BOND show the 
effect of these variables before the financial crisis, while the interaction terms of these 
variables with the DCRISIS variable show the differential influence of country variables during 
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the crisis. The influences of firm- and country-level characteristics are similar to those shown in 
Table 4. 
The coefficient of DCRISIS in column (6) shows that firms reduced their debt maturity by 
almost 3 per cent on average during the financial crisis in countries with low levels of the 
country characteristics. As for the interaction terms, the positive coefficients of 
DCRISIS*RULE_OF_LAW and DCRISIS*BANK_CONC reveal that higher levels of rule of law and 
bank concentration can be seen to lead to a reduction in the negative impact of the financial 
crisis on corporate debt maturity. Higher levels of legal enforcement and greater banking 
concentration thus helped firms to avoid the reduction in debt maturity resulting from the 
financial crisis. These results provide evidence in line with the role of relationship banking, as 
bank concentration is found to ameliorate the reduction in corporate debt maturity during the 
financial crisis. This means that firms in countries with a higher level of bank concentration 
suffered less stringent restrictions on debt maturity. This result is consistent with evidence 
provided by Petersen and Rajan (1995) that firms in less concentrated credit markets are 
subject to greater financial constraints. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
We test our third hypothesis in columns (7) and (8), analysing the effect of the weight of banks 
on corporate debt maturity during the financial crisis and whether this influence varies 
according to firm size. BANK_CREDIT measures the effect of this variable during the period 
before the financial crisis for small firms. The DCRISIS*BANK_CREDIT interaction term identifies 
the differential effect of BANK_CREDIT on corporate debt maturity during the financial crisis. 
The DCRISIS*SIZE variable measures the differential effect of the financial crisis on corporate 
debt maturity in larger firms. Finally, the coefficient of the DCRISIS*SIZE*BANK_CREDIT 
variable shows the differential impact of the financial crisis for larger firms in countries with a 
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large weight of banks in the economy9. The results in column (7) reveal that both the 
BANK_CREDIT and DCRISIS*BANK_CREDIT variables have a negative influence on corporate 
debt maturity, in line with the banking preference for short-term debt in both periods. These 
effects are economically significant, given that a one-standard deviation increase in the fitted 
value of BANK_CREDIT and DCRISIS*BANK_CREDIT would cause a reduction in debt maturity of 
-11.25 and -5.68 per cent, respectively. However, the positive coefficient of 
DCRISIS*SIZE*BANK_CREDIT shows that larger firms suffered a lower reduction in debt 
maturity compared to smaller firms during the financial crisis in countries where banks play an 
important role in the financing of the private sector. A one-standard deviation increase in the 
value of DCRISIS*SIZE*BANK_CREDIT would cause an increase of 2.88 per cent in the average 
value of the dependent variable. This positive differential effect of BANK_CREDIT on corporate 
debt maturity during the financial crisis for large firms is also maintained when we control for a 
potential size effect of bank concentration (column (8)). 
5. ROBUSTNESS 
In this section, we present additional robustness tests for our measure of the financial crisis. 
An important concern is that our measure of the financial crisis does not consider the fact that 
the crisis did not affect all the countries with the same intensity simultaneously. We address 
these issues taking into account proxies of the financial crisis that vary during the period 2008-
2012 as well as measures of the intensity of the financial crisis. 
First, we separately consider dummy variables identifying different sub-periods of the period 
2008-2012 instead of one dummy variable for the overall period. DCRISIS1, DCRISIS2 and 
DCRISIS3 are three dummy variables that take the value of 1 for the periods 2008-2009, 2010-
2011 and 2012, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The results using this definition of the financial 
                                                          
9 We also control for the influence of bank concentration on corporate debt maturity depending on firm 
size. 
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crisis are shown in Table 7. The coefficients of DCRISIS1, DCRISIS2 and DCRISIS3 are negative 
and significant in column (1) when only firm-level determinants of corporate debt maturity are 
considered, revealing a reduction in debt maturity during the different sub-periods of the 
financial crisis. In columns (2) to (4), when the firm- and country-level determinants of 
corporate debt maturity and the interaction effects of the crisis dummies and country-level 
variables are considered, at least one of the dummies measuring the financial crisis is negative 
and significant. In general, the results reveal that the negative effect of the crisis on corporate 
debt maturity was higher during the years 2010 and 2011. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
The results for the firm- and country-level variables and the interaction terms between the 
variables measuring the financial crisis and country-level variables are similar to those 
obtained when using DCRISIS as the measure of the financial crisis. Specifically, we obtain 
results that are consistent with an increase in corporate debt maturity in countries with higher 
bank concentration, as the coefficients of BANK_CONC and the interaction terms of this 
variable with the different periods of the financial crisis are always positive and significant. 
Similar to the results shown in Table 6, the coefficients for the interaction terms of 
BANK_CREDIT and DCRISIS1, DCRISIS2 and DCRISIS3 are negative and significant. Furthermore, 
the results in column (4) reveal that a large weight of banks in the financing of the private 
sector led to a higher reduction in corporate debt maturity during the period of the financial 
crisis, and this reduction affected smaller firms to a greater extent. 
Columns (5) to (8) confirm our evidence in line with the view that a credit supply shock is the 
predominant casual factor to explain corporate debt maturity during the recent crisis. The 
coefficients of the interaction terms between DCRISIS1, DCRISIS2 and DCRISIS3 identifying the 
crisis years and the firms’ external dependence (FD) are negative and statistically significant at 
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conventional levels regardless of whether we control for firm-level characteristics or whether 
we also control for country-level determinants of corporate debt maturity. 
Second, as the crisis has not had the same intensity in all economies, its consequences may 
have had a different influence on corporate debt maturity in different countries. We therefore 
check the robustness of our results by considering two measures of the intensity of the crisis in 
each country. On the one hand, we measure the intensity of the financial crisis as the 
difference between the average GDP growth rate for the period 2003-2007 minus the average 
GDP growth rate during the period 2008-2012 for each country. Thus, the greater the intensity 
of the crisis, the higher the value of this variable. On the other, we consider the percentage of 
non-performing loans for each country during the period 2008-2012 as a proxy for the 
intensity of the financial crisis. In both definitions, the variable (CRISIS_INTENSITY) only shows 
a measure of the intensity during the years 2008-2012, being zero in the remaining years. 
These results are reported in Table 8, in columns (1) to (4) for the former measure of the 
intensity of the financial crisis and in columns (5) to (8) for the latter measure. 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
For both measures of the intensity of the financial crisis (CRISIS_INTENSITY), the results show a 
negative relationship between this variable and corporate debt maturity (except for the 
coefficient in column (8)), suggesting that firms in those countries that suffered a stronger 
financial crisis present a greater reduction in their debt maturity. Firm- and country-level 
determinants of corporate debt maturity maintain the sign and significance reported in 
previous tables. Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) present the results for the interactions between 
CRISIS_INTENSITY and institutional characteristics and banking structure variables on 
corporate debt maturity during the financial crisis. As for the influence of country-level 
determinants during the financial crisis, higher levels of rule of law (except in column (8)), 
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protection of creditor rights and bank concentration are seen to reduce the negative impact of 
the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity. 
The results also show that there is a negative effect of the weight of banks in the economy in 
the period before the financial crisis as well as during the financial crisis. However, the positive 
coefficient of CRISIS_INTENSITY*SIZE*BANK_CREDIT suggests that smaller firms suffered more 
restrictions in terms of debt maturity during the financial crisis in countries where banks play 
an important role in the financing of the private sector. 
The results also show that the coefficient of DCRISIS*SIZE is negative and significant in column 
(8), while that of CRISIS_INTENSITY is not significant. This reveals that the negative effect of 
the crisis on corporate debt maturity seems to be concentrated in large firms. This seemingly 
surprising result is consistent with the data provided by the ECB bank lending survey, which 
indicates that the crisis had a greater impact on large firms than on small firms. The ECB survey 
shows an increase in the tightening of credit standards for loans or credit lines to enterprises 
as a result of the financial crisis, although this tightening is not equally distributed across firms 
according to size. For the first quarter of 2008, a net percentage of 53% of banks reported a 
tightening of the credit standards they applied to large firms, while this percentage was only 
34% for small and medium-sized enterprises. Furthermore, non-price terms and conditions 
also contributed more strongly to the net tightening for large firms than for SMEs, especially as 
regards the size of loans and credit lines, but also in terms of collateral, loan covenants and 
loan maturity. 
Summing up, when we consider the different intensity of the financial crisis on corporate debt 
maturity, we confirm our main results: (1) the financial crisis reduced corporate debt maturity; 
(2) the effect of bank concentration on corporate debt maturity was more positive during the 
financial crisis, revealing the value of relationship banking as a way of improving the credit 
conditions of borrowers during periods of uncertainty; and (3) the debt maturity of larger firms 
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decreased less as a result of the financial crisis than the debt maturity of smaller firms in 
countries where banks play an important role in the financing of the private sector.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyses the effect of the Global Financial Crisis on corporate debt maturity for a 
sample of 39 countries. Although corporate debt maturity was found to decline during the 
financial crisis, the effect is weak for the average firm. Total, long- and short-term leverage 
increased during the financial crisis compared to the average leverage in the period before the 
crisis. The results highlight that the increase in short-term debt is higher than in long-term 
debt, leading to a reduction in corporate debt maturity. Furthermore, the negative effect of 
the crisis on corporate debt maturity was stronger in those firms that are more dependent on 
external finance before the onset of the crisis. This result is addressed by a higher negative 
effect of the crisis on long-term debt than in short-term debt for firms with a greater 
dependence on external finance. These results provide evidence in line with the crisis having a 
credit supply effect that reduced the availability of corporate debt, especially long-term debt, 
shortening the corporate debt maturity of firms that were more dependent of external finance 
before the onset of the financial crisis. 
We also analyze how the banking structure of the country affects the impact of the financial 
crisis on corporate debt maturity. The impact of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity 
varied depending on banking concentration and the role played by banks in the financing of 
the private sector. Higher levels of bank concentration are seen to reduce the negative impact 
of the financial crisis on corporate debt maturity, suggesting that higher bank concentration 
increases bank incentives to establish close relations with borrowers over time. This last result 
is consistent with the importance of bank concentration (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berlin and 
Mester, 1999), as firms in less concentrated credit markets are subject to greater financial 
constraints. 
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We likewise show that the reduction in debt maturity was greater in countries where banks 
play an important role in the financing of the private sector, in keeping with the preferences of 
banks having an even greater influence on debt maturity structures during the financial crisis. 
Moreover, the reduction in debt maturity was lower for larger firms compared to smaller firms 
during the financial crisis in countries where banks play an important role in the financing of 
the private sector, suggesting that smaller firms were affected to a greater extent by bank 
preferences as they also are more dependent on domestic bank credit. 
The evidence provided in the paper is robust to alternative measures of the financial crisis 
which consider that the recent crisis did not affect all countries with the same intensity 
simultaneously. Specifically, our results reveal that the effect of the crisis on corporate debt 
maturity was stronger during the years 2010 and 2011 and in those countries where the 
intensity of the crisis was greater.  
Our results have potential policy implications, as they suggest that the financial crisis 
systematically affected corporate debt structure, but did so in an unequal way across firms and 
across countries, confirming the relevance of banking structure in corporate financing both in 
normal times and during economic and financial downturns. Bank concentration and the 
weight of banks in the financing of the private sector are revealed to affect the bank incentives 
to extend debt maturity during the crisis. Thus, regulators should consider the externalities for 
the real economy of the financial system when designing policies to develop or support the 
financial system. 
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Figure 1. Differences in debt maturity across countries during the financial crisis 
This figure represents the difference between the average long-term debt to total debt ratio before (1995-2007) and during (2008-2012) the crisis for the countries included 
in our sample. Long-term debt is debt with a maturity of more than one year. Data from the Worldscope database. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panels A, B and C report the descriptive statistics of firm-level and country-level variables for the overall 
sample, before and during the crisis. DEBT_MAT is the percentage of the firm’s total debt that has a 
maturity of more than one year. ASSET_MAT is the ratio between net fixed assets and total assets. 
GROWTH is the market-to-book ratio. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. FIRM_QUALITY is the ratio of 
net income plus depreciation to net debt. VOL_EBIT is the absolute value of change in earnings before 
interest and taxes. LEV is the ratio between total debt and the firm’s market value. RULE OF LAW is one of 
the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2009) and is a 
measure of the efficiency of the legal system. S_RIGHTS measures the protection of property rights. 
C_RIGHTS measures creditor rights. BANK_CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks in each country. BANK_CREDIT is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to 
GDP. BOND is the sum of the private bond market capitalization to GDP plus the international debt issues 
to GDP.  
 
 Number of 
observations 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
First quartile Third 
quartile 
Panel A: Total Sample       
DEBT_MAT (%) 171,892 47.19 48.19 34.01 14.23 77.35 
ASSET_MAT (%) 171,892 33.22 30.36 22.19 15.58 47.49 
GROWTH 171,892 1.79 1.21 2.02 0.69 2.15 
SIZE 171,892 5.19 5.15 2.09 3.88 6.50 
FIRM_QUALITY 171,892 2.22 0.38 10.56 0.16 0.96 
VOL_EBIT 171,892 1.28 0.48 2.77 0.20 1.14 
LEV (%) 171,892 33.00 28.31 25.03 11.45 50.88 
RULE_OF_LAW 171,892 1.09 1.32 0.70 0.75 1.66 
S_RIGHTS 171,892 74.28 70.00 16.89 70.00 90.00 
C_RIGHTS 171,892 2.00 2.00 1.09 1.00 3.00 
BANK_CONC (%) 164,507 52.30 46.75 19.44 36.12 64.50 
BANK_CREDIT (%) 154,381 91.59 98.43 40.01 54.98 109.71 
BOND (%) 136,701 72.82 61.80 40.49 46.30 97.12 
Panel B: Before the crisis       
DEBT_MAT (%) 99,150 49.09 50.69 33.92 17.51 79.55 
ASSET_MAT (%) 99,150 33.77 31.00 21.60 16.86 47.47 
GROWTH 99,150 2.02 1.40 2.14 0.81 2.43 
SIZE 99,150 5.28 5.24 2.01 4.00 6.55 
FIRM_QUALITY 99,150 2.31 0.42 10.67 0.18 1.01 
VOL_EBIT 99,150 1.22 0.45 2.67 0.19 1.08 
LEV (%) 99,150 31.05 25.97 24.22 10.49 47.60 
RULE_OF_LAW 99,150 1.15 1.36 0.67 0.79 1.69 
S_RIGHTS 99,150 76.57 90.00 16.37 70.00 90.00 
C_RIGHTS 99,150 1.99 2.00 1.11 1.00 3.00 
BANK_CONC (%) 97,807 50.97 45.03 20.09 35.26 63.68 
BANK_CREDIT (%) 91,648 86.55 93.14 36.45 53.04 110.93 
BOND (%) 82,023 69.19 60.42 34.21 47.22 90.58 
Panel C: During the crisis       
DEBT_MAT (%) 72,742 44.58 44.44 33.96 10.20 74.10 
ASSET_MAT (%) 72,742 32.47 29.46 22.94 13.59 47.50 
GROWTH 72,742 1.48 0.99 1.80 0.57 1.75 
SIZE 72,742 5.06 5.01 2.20 3.74 6.42 
FIRM_QUALITY 72,742 2.10 0.34 10.41 0.13 0.88 
VOL_EBIT 72,742 1.37 0.52 2.89 0.21 1.23 
LEV (%) 72,742 35.64 31.80 25.85 13.03 55.25 
RULE_OF_LAW 72,742 1.00 1.27 0.72 0.52 1.60 
S_RIGHTS 72,742 71.16 70.00 17.09 50.00 90.00 
C_RIGHTS 72,742 2.02 2.00 1.05 1.00 3.00 
BANK_CONC (%) 66,700 54.24 50.58 18.28 44.16 67.03 
BANK_CREDIT (%) 62,733 98.96 103.41 43.67 62.99 107.13 
BOND (%) 54,678 78.26 67.32 47.89 45.05 109.77 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by country 
Table 2 reports the mean values of the dependent variables and country-level variables for each country. 
DEBT_MAT is the percentage of the firm’s total debt that has a maturity of more than one year. RULE OF 
LAW is one of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators compiled by Kaufmann et al. 
(2009) and is a measure of the efficiency of the legal system and the protection of property rights. 
C_RIGHTS measures the protection of creditor rights. BANK_CONC is the fraction of assets held by the 
three largest commercial banks in each country. BANK_CREDIT is the ratio of private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP. BOND is the sum of the private bond market capitalization to GDP plus the 
international debt issues to GDP.  
 
COUNTRY Number of observations 
DEBT_MAT 
(%) 
RULE 
OF 
LAW 
S_RIGHTS C_RIGHTS BANK_CONC (%) 
BANK_CREDIT 
(%) 
BOND 
(%) 
Argentina 503 45.16 -0.56 33.18 1 40.41 13.95 32.94 
Australia 5,186 49.76 1.76 90.00 3 65.45 108.99 95.84 
Austria 649 50.71 1.85 90.00 3 64.64 110.46 109.74 
Belgium 1,040 50.51 1.39 85.91 2 87.13 82.86 115.01 
Brazil 2,385 51.38 -0.26 50.00 1 51.48 36.80 26.18 
Canada 6,958 59.88 1.77 90.00 1 60.20 95.61 61.99 
Chile 1,278 57.30 1.24 89.17 2 54.93 60.10 23.04 
Denmark 1,265 52.29 1.90 90.34 3 79.77 124.06 170.31 
Finland 1,175 58.72 1.93 90.43 1 96.35 74.81 68.21 
France 5,275 50.72 1.42 72.15 0 60.26 98.73 96.91 
Germany 5,754 51.37 1.68 90.00 3 69.56 110.50 107.36 
Greece 2,513 36.07 0.72 55.09 1 67.97 78.76 77.29 
Hong Kong 7,009 37.65 1.43 90.00 4 70.17 152.38 48.95 
India 12,733 53.87 0.02 50.00 2 31.43 41.95 - 
Indonesia 2,499 42.20 -0.73 33.29 2.07 49.60 25.67 6.73 
Ireland 400 63.48 1.68 90.00 1 66.63 152.15 177.28 
Israel 1,639 50.72 0.89 70.00 3 78.15 90.92 - 
Italy 2,119 45.76 0.53 59.12 2 46.88 93.44 77.79 
Japan 29,635 40.03 1.33 76.26 1.20 41.46 104.79 48.20 
Malaysia 7,344 33.28 0.49 53.00 3 49.75 99.83 67.72 
Mexico 968 63.71 -0.48 50.00 0 60.93 16.88 23.87 
Netherlands 1,249 56.71 1.78 90.00 3 78.94 164.79 166.93 
New Zealand 769 65.90 1.87 91.97 4 78.60 126.41 - 
Norway 1,177 66.98 1.91 90.00 2 93.28 70.84 41.56 
Pakistan 1,621 34.71 -0.85 33.06 1 46.58 23.34 - 
Peru 652 41.66 -0.67 39.28 0 74.39 21.62 13.17 
Philippines 1,033 41.34 -0.49 39.66 1 47.10 30.22 22.66 
Portugal 559 51.35 1.11 70.00 1 85.00 142.23 102.71 
Singapore 4,635 34.14 1.65 90.00 3 92.28 96.77 46.96 
South Africa 2,049 44.69 0.10 50.00 3 77.79 70.90 27.30 
South Korea 11,480 32.92 0.90 73.26 3 58.69 92.23 69.33 
Spain 1,220 53.13 1.20 70.00 2 66.48 146.62 109.67 
Sweden 2,416 58.89 1.88 87.08 1 95.40 88.22 107.83 
Switzerland 1,836 60.02 1.88 89.30 1 84.63 160.68 96.81 
Taiwan 11,901 33.06 0.89 72.02 2 28.92 - - 
Thailand 3,927 32.84 0.02 56.27 2.10 48.42 93.49 17.43 
Turkey 1,917 33.10 0.03 53.15 2 55.46 26.85 7.29 
UK 8,938 58.27 1.72 89.27 4 52.13 159.64 88.90 
US 16,186 73.10 1.61 89.54 1 30.33 51.78 120.63 
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Table 3. Correlations 
The table presents the correlation matrix. DEBT_MAT is the percentage of the firm’s total debt that has a maturity of more than one year. ASSET_MAT is the ratio between net fixed assets and total assets. GROWTH is the market-to-book ratio. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of sales. VOL_EBIT is the absolute value of change in earnings before interest and taxes. FIRM_QUALITY is the ratio of net income plus depreciation to net debt. LEV is the ratio between total debt and the firm’s market value. RULE OF LAW is one of the 
six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2009) and is a measure of the efficiency of the legal system. S_RIGHTS measures the protection of property rights. C_RIGHTS measures creditor rights. BANK_CONC is the 
fraction of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in each country. BANK_CREDIT is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. DCRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, and 
zero otherwise. FD is the ratio of debt and total assets one year before the onset of the crisis, at December 2006. DCRISIS1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008 and 2009, and zero otherwise. DCRISIS2 is a dummy variables that takes 
the value of 1 for the years 2010 and 2011, and zero otherwise. DCRISIS3 is a dummy variables that takes the value of 1 for the year 2012, and zero otherwise. CRISIS_INTENSITY1 is the difference between the mean GDP growth for the period 2008-2012 minus 
the mean GDP growth for the period 2003-2007. CRISIS_INTENSITY2 is the non-performing loans for each country during the period 2008-2012. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 DEBT_MAT ASSET_MAT GROWTH SIZE FIRM_QUALITY VOL_EBIT LEV RULE_OF_LAW S_RIGHTS C_RIGHTS BANK_CONC BANK_CREDIT BOND DCRISIS DCRISIS*FD DCRISIS1 DCRISIS2 DCRISIS3 CRISIS_INTENSITY1 
ASSET_MAT 0.178***                   
GROWTH 0.099*** -0.103***                  
SIZE 0.222*** -0.011*** 0.067***                 
FIRM_QUALITY -0.115*** -0.067*** 0.069*** 0.018***                
VOL_EBIT -0.028*** -0.004 -0.022*** -0.101*** -0.037***               
LEV 0.071*** 0.219*** -0.363*** 0.041*** -0.240*** 0.067***              
RULE_OF_LAW 0.137*** -0.148*** 0.099*** 0.164*** -0.018*** 0.024*** -0.170***             
S_RIGHTS 0.141*** -0.117*** 0.094*** 0.152*** -0.019*** 0.025*** -0.142*** 0.908***            
C_RIGHTS -0.092*** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.132*** 0.006** 0.011*** -0.020*** 0.068*** 0.167***           
BANK_CONC -0.033*** -0.056*** 0.016*** -0.075*** -0.006** 0.021*** -0.062*** 0.282*** 0.243*** 0.464***          
BANK_CREDIT -0.078*** -0.131*** -0.037*** 0.059*** -0.015*** 0.028*** -0.059*** 0.563*** 0.495*** 0.283*** 0.385***         
BOND 0.206*** -0.128*** 0.113*** 0.048*** -0.018*** 0.012*** -0.078*** 0.518*** 0.466*** 0.030*** 0.075*** 0.285***        
DCRISIS -0.066*** -0.029*** -0.133*** -0.052*** -0.010*** 0.028*** 0.091*** -0.104*** -0.158*** 0.014*** 0.082*** 0.152*** 0.110***       
DCRISIS*FD -0.030*** 0.061*** -0.153*** 0.063*** -0.069*** 0.026*** 0.308*** -0.060*** -0.104*** -0.003 0.064*** 0.109*** 0.001 0.556***      
DCRISIS1 -0.031*** -0.010*** -0.094*** -0.056*** -0.015*** 0.010*** 0.086*** -0.063*** -0.115*** 0.007*** 0.033*** 0.084*** 0.046*** 0.533*** 0.328***     
DCRISIS2 -0.039*** -0.022*** -0.053*** -0.032*** 0.001 0.028*** 0.019*** -0.052*** -0.070*** 0.010*** 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.548*** 0.293*** -0.214***    
DCRISIS3 -0.022*** -0.008*** -0.038*** 0.029*** 0.001 -0.005* 0.019*** -0.032*** -0.031*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.047*** 0.014*** 0.321*** 0.148*** -0.125** -0.129***   
CRISIS_INTENSITY1 -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.109*** -0.038*** -0.010*** 0.022*** 0.099*** -0.044*** -0.095*** 0.064*** 0.150*** 0.269*** 0.205*** 0.784*** 0.441*** 0.422*** 0.429*** 0.246***  
CRISIS_INTENSITY2 -0.029*** 0.000 -0.094*** -0.028*** -0.009*** 0.007** 0.120*** -0.248*** -0.288*** -0.080*** -0.002 0.043*** 0.252*** 0.673*** 0.402*** 0.331*** 0.388*** 0.220*** 0.711*** 
 
 Table 4. Debt maturity and the financial crisis 
Regressions are estimated using panel data. The dependent variable (DEBT_MAT) is the percentage of the firm’s total debt that
has a maturity of more than one year. ASSET_MAT is the ratio between net fixed assets and total assets. GROWTH is the market
to-book ratio. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. FIRM_QUALITY is the ratio of net income plus depreciation to net debt. 
VOL_EBIT is the absolute value of change in earnings before interest and taxes. LEV is the ratio between total debt and the firm’s 
market value. DCRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, and zero 
otherwise. FD is the ratio of debt and total assets one year before the onset of the crisis, at December 2006. RULE_OF_LAW is one 
of the six dimensions of the WGI and is a measure of the efficiency of the legal system. S_RIGHTS measures the protection of 
property rights. C_RIGHTS measures creditor rights. BANK_CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three largest commercial 
banks in each country. BANK_CREDIT is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. BOND is the sum of the private 
bond market capitalization to GDP plus the international debt issues to GDP. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that the introduction of instrumental variables has no influence on the coefficients of the estimations. We report
instrumental variables estimations if the test is significant at the 10 percent level. Country-year, industry-year and firm
effects are included in all the estimations, although we do not report their coefficients. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.4404*** (50.35) 
0.4084*** 
(14.96) 
0.4049*** 
(14.93) 
0.4423*** 
(50.56) 
0.4154*** 
(15.21) 
0.4124***
(15.19)
ASSET_MAT 0.0553*** (6.34) 
0.0353*** 
(3.42) 
0.0354*** 
(3.43) 
0.0536*** 
(6.14) 
0.0333*** 
(3.22) 
0.0333***
(3.23) 
GROWTH 0.0035*** (6.76) 
0.0034*** 
(5.75) 
0.0034*** 
(5.74) 
0.0037*** 
(7.15) 
0.0036*** 
(6.12) 
0.0036***
(6.11) 
SIZE 0.0039** (2.54) 
0.0081*** 
(4.46) 
0.0082*** 
(4.50) 
0.0032** 
(2.08) 
0.0074*** 
(4.05) 
0.0074***
(4.08) 
FIRM_QUALITY -0.0009*** (-9.77) 
-0.0008*** 
(-8.03) 
-0.0008*** 
(-8.02) 
-0.0009*** 
(-9.64) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.92) 
-0.0008***
(-7.92) 
VOL_EBIT -0.0002 (-0.85) 
-0.0000 
(-0.05) 
-0.0000 
(-0.07) 
-0.0002 
(-0.80) 
-0.0000 
(-0.01) 
-0.0000
(-0.02) 
LEV 0.0497*** (9.59) 
0.0628*** 
(10.19) 
0.0623*** 
(10.13) 
0.0472*** 
(9.09) 
0.0602*** 
(9.74) 
0.0597***
(9.69) 
DCRISIS -0.0100*** (-4.94) 
-0.0042 
(-1.40) 
-0.0038 
(-1.29) 
0.0061** 
(2.04) 
0.0125*** 
(3.18) 
0.0129***
(3.29) 
DCRISIS*FD - - - -0.0566
*** 
(-7.20) 
-0.0583*** 
(-6.51) 
-0.0586***
(-6.54) 
RULE_OF_LAW - 0.0109 (0.83) 
0.0090 
(0.69)  
0.0099 
(0.75) 
0.0083
(0.63) 
C_RIGHTS - 0.0186
*** 
(4.44) 
0.0181*** 
(4.35)  
0.0183*** 
(4.37) 
0.0179***
(4.29) 
S_RIGHTS - -0.0002 (-1.15) -  
-0.0002 
(-0.98)  
BANK_CONC - 0.0849
*** 
(5.96) 
0.0832*** 
(5.87)  
0.0790*** 
(5.54) 
0.0776***
(5.47) 
BANK_CREDIT - -0.1258
*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.1383*** 
(-4.38)  
-0.1290*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.1397***
(-4.42) 
BOND  0.0007
*** 
(3.75) 
0.0008*** 
(4.27)  
0.0007*** 
(3.93) 
0.0008***
(4.41) 
Hausman test 1,418.97*** 1,211.82*** 1,117.94*** 1,538.29*** 1,251.58*** 1,179.62***
F test 45.59*** 23.88*** 25.49*** 46.23*** 25.05*** 26.65***
# observations 135,621 101,460 101,460 135,621 101,460 101,460
# firms 27,881 21,595 21,595 27,881 21,595 21,595
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test - 4.00*** 5.36*** - 4.72*** 5.99***
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Table 5. Debt and the financial crisis 
Regressions are estimated using panel data. The dependent variables are the ratios between total debt (columns (1) and (2)), long-
term debt (columns (3) and (4)), and short-term debt (columns (5) and (6)) and the market value of assets. The market value of 
assets is defined as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. PROFITABILITY is measured as EBIT 
plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets. GROWTH is the market-to-
book ratio. TANGIBILITY is the ratio between property, plant and equipment and total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. 
C_RIGHTS measures creditor rights. DCRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 
2012, and zero otherwise. FD is the ratio of debt and total assets one year before the onset of the crisis, at December 2006. 
Country-year, industry-year and firm-specific effects are included in all the estimations, although we do not report their 
coefficients. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.2104
*** 
(30.80) 
0.2126*** 
(31.17) 
0.0773*** 
(15.87) 
0.0786*** 
(16.15) 
0.1331*** 
(27.72) 
0.1340*** 
(27.93) 
PROFITABILITY -0.0002
* 
(-1.68) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.68) 
0.0000 
(0.16) 
0.0000 
(0.16) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.55) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.55) 
GROWTH -0.0209
*** 
(-66.58) 
-0.0204*** 
(-64.72) 
-0.0107*** 
(-47.74) 
-0.0104*** 
(-46.25) 
-0.0102*** 
(-46.26) 
-0.0100*** 
(-45.06) 
TANGIBILITY 0.1706
*** 
(32.09) 
0.1682*** 
(31.67) 
0.1265*** 
(33.34) 
0.1251*** 
(32.99) 
0.0441*** 
(11.81) 
0.0431*** 
(11.53) 
SIZE 0.0017
* 
(1.82) 
0.0007 
(0.78) 
0.0042*** 
(6.30) 
0.0037*** 
(5.47) 
-0.0025*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.0029*** 
(-4.45) 
C_RIGHTS 0.0077
*** 
(4.53) 
0.0076*** 
(4.46) 
0.0044*** 
(3.64) 
0.0043*** 
(3.58) 
0.0033*** 
(2.75) 
0.0032*** 
(2.70) 
DCRISIS 0.0441
*** 
(35.64) 
0.0677*** 
(36.88) 
0.0186*** 
(21.11) 
0.0321*** 
(24.47) 
0.0255*** 
(29.28) 
0.0357*** 
(27.61) 
DCRISIS*FD   
-0.0824*** 
(-17.38) 
 
 
-0.0469*** 
(-13.85) 
 
 
-0.0356*** 
(-10.66) 
Hausman test 204.34*** 3,521.43*** 300.00*** 1,137.41*** 525.47*** 3,149.89*** 
F test 1049.04*** 968.68*** 575.10*** 533.43*** 513.54*** 469.58*** 
# observations 135,421 135,421 135,421 135,421 135,421 135,421 
# firms 27,862 27,862 27,862 27,862 27,862 27,862 
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Table 6. Country-level determinants of firm debt maturity and financial 
crisis 
Regressions are estimated using panel data. The dependent variable (DEBT_MAT) is the percentage of the firm’s total debt that 
has a maturity of more than one year. ASSET_MAT is the ratio between net fixed assets and total assets. GROWTH is the growth 
rate of the GDP. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. VOL_EBIT is the absolute value of change in earnings before interest and 
taxes. FIRM_QUALITY is the ratio of net income plus depreciation to net debt. LEV is the ratio between total debt and the firm’s 
market value. DCRISIS is a dummy variables that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, and zero 
otherwise. RULE_OF_LAW is one of the six dimensions of the WGI and is a measure of the efficiency of the legal system. C_RIGHTS 
measures creditor rights. BANK_CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in each country. 
BANK_CREDIT is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. BOND is the sum of the private bond market 
capitalization to GDP plus the international debt issues to GDP. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
introduction of instrumental variables has no influence on the coefficients of the estimations. We report instrumental variables 
estimations if the test is significant at the 10 percent level. Country-year, industry-year and firm-specific effects are included in all 
the estimations, although we do not report their coefficients. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.4092
*** 
(15.02) 
0.3981*** 
(14.51) 
0.4140*** 
(15.22) 
0.4050*** 
(14.93) 
0.4038*** 
(14.88) 
0.4152*** 
(14.83) 
0.4286*** 
(15.21) 
0.4284*** 
(15.20) 
ASSET_MAT 0.0352
*** 
(3.41) 
0.0367*** 
(3.54) 
0.0381*** 
(3.68) 
0.0352*** 
(3.41) 
0.0355*** 
(3.43) 
0.0377*** 
(3.64) 
0.0369*** 
(3.56) 
0.0370*** 
(3.57) 
GROWTH 0.0034
*** 
(5.80) 
0.0033*** 
(5.70) 
0.0033*** 
(5.65) 
0.0034*** 
(5.71) 
0.0034*** 
(5.79) 
0.0033*** 
(5.57) 
0.0033*** 
(5.56) 
0.0033*** 
(5.55) 
SIZE 0.0083
*** 
(4.54) 
0.0080*** 
(4.41) 
0.0078*** 
(4.28) 
0.0082*** 
(4.49) 
0.0082*** 
(4.49) 
0.0077*** 
(4.23) 
0.0059*** 
(3.16) 
0.0059*** 
(3.17) 
FIRM_QUALITY -0.0008
*** 
(-8.04) 
-0.0008*** 
(-8.01) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.95) 
-0.0008*** 
(-8.02) 
-0.0008*** 
(-8.03) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.92) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.93) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.93) 
VOL_EBIT -0.0000 (-0.06) 
-0.0000 
(-0.07) 
-0.0000 
(-0.05) 
-0.0000 
(-0.07) 
-0.0000 
(-0.06) 
-0.0000 
(-0.07) 
-0.0000 
(-0.09) 
-0.0000 
(-0.09) 
LEV 0.0621
*** 
(10.11) 
0.0625*** 
(10.16) 
0.0626*** 
(10.19) 
0.0624*** 
(10.15) 
0.0618*** 
(10.04) 
0.0637*** 
(10.33) 
0.0638*** 
(10.35) 
0.0639*** 
(10.35) 
DCRISIS -0.0089
** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0095** 
(-2.08) 
-0.0364*** 
(-4.69) 
-0.0009 
(-0.15) 
-0.0078* 
(-1.80) 
-0.0296*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.0262 
(-1.61) 
-0.0396* 
(-1.73) 
RULE_OF_LAW 0.0084 (0.64) 
0.0098 
(0.75) 
0.0059 
(0.45) 
0.0087 
(0.66) 
0.0075 
(0.57) 
0.0020 
(0.15) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
0.0005 
(0.04) 
C_RIGHTS 0.0189
*** 
(4.50) 
0.0173*** 
(4.12) 
0.0195*** 
(4.66) 
0.0183*** 
(4.38) 
0.0177*** 
(4.24) 
0.0211*** 
(4.88) 
0.0209*** 
(4.83) 
0.0209*** 
(4.84) 
BANK_CONC 0.0822
*** 
(5.79) 
0.0858*** 
(6.02) 
0.0724*** 
(5.04) 
0.0836*** 
(5.90) 
0.0831*** 
(5.87) 
0.0762*** 
(5.18) 
0.0777*** 
(5.28) 
0.0772*** 
(5.24) 
BANK_CREDIT -0.1448
*** 
(-4.55) 
-0.1294*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.1363*** 
(-4.32) 
-0.1384*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.1324*** 
(-4.15) 
-0.1360*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.1396*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.1397*** 
(-4.19) 
BOND 0.0008
*** 
(4.32) 
0.0008*** 
(4.13) 
0.0007*** 
(3.85) 
0.0008*** 
(4.24) 
0.0008*** 
(4.15) 
0.0006*** 
(3.39) 
0.0007*** 
(3.60) 
0.0007*** 
(3.59) 
DCRISIS*RULE_OF_LAW 0.0048
* 
(1.66) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0.0086** 
(2.21) 
0.0083** 
(2.11) 
0.0078** 
(1.98) 
DCRISIS*C_RIGHTS  0.0027 (1.64) 
 
 
 
  
0.0029 
(1.42) 
0.0044** 
(2.15) 
0.0043** 
(2.11) 
DCRISIS*BANK_CONC   0.0565
*** 
(4.54) 
  0.0598*** (4.20) 
0.0600*** 
(4.22) 
0.0901** 
(2.31) 
DCRISIS*BANK_CREDIT    -0.0027 (-0.60)  
-0.0243*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.0478*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.0512*** 
(-3.65) 
DCRISIS*BOND     0.0000 (1.25) 
0.0000 
(0.62) 
0.0000 
(0.38) 
0.0000 
(0.42) 
DCRISIS*SIZE       -0.0005 (-0.20) 
0.0018 
(0.48) 
DCRISIS*SIZE*BANK_CREDIT       0.0039
* 
(1.96) 
0.0045** 
(2.12) 
DCRISIS*SIZE*BANK_CONC        -0.0052 (-0.83) 
Hausman test 1,149.83*** 1,154.81*** 1,234.22*** 1,180.83*** 1,112.42*** 1,379.09*** 1,409.41*** 1,401.73*** 
F test 23.98*** 23.97*** 25.17*** 23.82*** 23.90*** 20.56*** 19.61*** 18.75*** 
# observations 101,460 101,460 101,460 101,460 101,460 101,460 101,460 101,460 
# firms 21,595 21,595 21,595 21,595 21,595 21,595 21,595 21,595 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 6.24*** 3.75** 4.77*** 5.98*** 5.86*** 3.86*** 4.21*** 4.27*** 
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Table 7. Debt maturity and evolution of the financial crisis 
Regressions are estimated using panel data. The dependent variable (DEBT_MAT) is the percentage of the firm’s total debt that has a maturity of more than one year. ASSET_MAT is the ratio between net fixed 
assets and total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate of the GDP. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. VOL_EBIT is the absolute value of change in earnings before interest and taxes. FIRM_QUALITY is the ratio 
of net income plus depreciation to net debt. LEV is the ratio between total debt and the firm’s market value. DCRISIS1 is a dummy variables that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008 and 2009, and zero 
otherwise. DCRISIS2 is a dummy variables that takes the value of 1 for the years 2010 and 2011, and zero otherwise. DCRISIS3 is a dummy variables that takes the value of 1 for the year 2012, and zero 
otherwise. FD is the ratio of debt and total assets one year before the onset of the crisis, at December 2006. RULE_OF_LAW is one of the six dimensions of the WGI and is a measure of the efficiency of the legal 
system. C_RIGHTS measures creditor rights. BANK_CREDIT is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. BANK_CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in each 
country. BOND is the sum of the private bond market capitalization to GDP plus the international debt issues to GDP. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null hypothesis that the introduction of 
instrumental variables has no influence on the coefficients of the estimations. We report instrumental variables estimations if the test is significant at the 10 percent level. Country-year, industry-year and firm-
specific effects are included in all the estimations, although we do not report their coefficients. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.4200
*** 
(46.37) 
0.3845*** 
(13.23) 
0.4087*** 
(13.47) 
0.4223*** 
(13.85) 
0.4198*** 
(46.30) 
0.3939*** 
(13.54) 
0.4141*** 
(13.64) 
0.4283*** 
(14.04) 
ASSET_MAT 0.0557
*** 
(6.38) 
0.0374*** 
(3.62) 
0.0393*** 
(3.79) 
0.0383*** 
(3.69) 
0.0545*** 
(6.25) 
0.0353*** 
(3.42) 
0.0374*** 
(3.60) 
0.0362*** 
(3.49) 
GROWTH 0.0035
*** 
(6.79) 
0.0033*** 
(5.71) 
0.0032*** 
(5.49) 
0.0032*** 
(5.51) 
0.0037*** 
(7.12) 
0.0036*** 
(6.09) 
0.0034*** 
(5.81) 
0.0034*** 
(5.84) 
SIZE 0.0045
*** 
(2.95) 
0.0078*** 
(4.28) 
0.0075*** 
(4.10) 
0.0054*** 
(2.85) 
0.0042*** 
(2.76) 
0.0071*** 
(3.87) 
0.0068*** 
(3.68) 
0.0046** 
(2.43) 
FIRM_QUALITY -0.0009
*** 
(-9.82) 
-0.0008*** 
(-8.03) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.90) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.84) 
-0.0009*** 
(-9.72) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.91) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.78) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.71) 
VOL_EBIT -0.0002 (-0.92) 
0.0000 
(0.07) 
0.0000 
(0.05) 
-0.0000 
(-0.11) 
-0.0002 
(-0.77) 
0.0000 
(0.12) 
0.0000 
(0.10) 
-0.0000 
(-0.06) 
LEV 0.0495
*** 
(9.55) 
0.0638*** 
(10.35) 
0.0647*** 
(10.44) 
0.0661*** 
(10.67) 
0.0481*** 
(9.25) 
0.0611*** 
(9.89) 
0.0623*** 
(10.02) 
0.0637*** 
(10.24) 
DCRISIS1 -0.0091
*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.0007 
(-0.22) 
-0.0288*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.0043 
(-0.26) 
0.0089*** 
(2.80) 
0.0148*** 
(3.53) 
-0.0099 
(-1.00) 
0.0179 
(1.05) 
DCRISIS2 -0.0159
*** 
(-6.39) 
-0.0120*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.0375*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.0294* 
(-1.75) 
0.0015 
(0.43) 
0.0067 
(1.43) 
-0.0145 
(-1.35) 
-0.0035 
(-0.20) 
DCRISIS3 -0.0337
*** 
(-10.15) 
-0.0084 
(-1.55) 
-0.0292** 
(-2.01) 
-0.0135 
(-0.55) 
-0.0285*** 
(-6.50) 
0.0067 
(1.03) 
-0.0112 
(-0.73) 
0.0083 
(0.33) 
DCRISIS1*FD     -0.0655
*** 
(-7.42) 
-0.0536*** 
(-5.22) 
-0.0509*** 
(-4.89) 
-0.0509*** 
(-4.88) 
DCRISIS2*FD     -0.0636
*** 
(-7.07) 
-0.0652*** 
(-6.23) 
-0.0629*** 
(-5.93) 
-0.0652*** 
(-6.13) 
DCRISIS3*FD     -0.0023 (-0.20) 
-0.0482*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.0440*** 
(-3.07) 
-0.0478*** 
(-3.34) 
RULE_OF_LAW   
0.0212 
(1.58) 
0.0151 
(1.09) 
0.0218 
(1.56)  
0.0199 
(1.48) 
0.0144 
(1.04) 
0.0216 
(1.54) 
C_RIGHTS   
0.0216*** 
(4.91) 
0.0277*** 
(5.90) 
0.0296*** 
(6.26)  
0.0211*** 
(4.81) 
0.0265*** 
(5.65) 
0.0286*** 
(6.04) 
BANK_CONC   
0.0831*** 
(5.86) 
0.0707*** 
(4.75) 
0.0753*** 
(5.05)  
0.0771*** 
(5.43) 
0.0665*** 
(4.45) 
0.0708*** 
(4.74) 
BANK CREDIT   
-0.1455*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.1679*** 
(-4.54) 
-0.1943*** 
(-5.13)  
-0.1479*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.1654*** 
(-4.47) 
-0.1935*** 
(-5.11) 
BOND   
0.0007*** 
(3.12) 
0.0006** 
(2.42) 
0.0006*** 
(2.75)  
0.0007*** 
(3.31) 
0.0006*** 
(2.59) 
0.0007*** 
(2.95) 
DCRISIS1*RULE_OF_LAW   
 
 
0.0065 
(1.46) 
0.0031 
(0.69)   
0.0039 
(0.88) 
0.0003 
(0.07) 
DCRISIS2*RULE_OF_LAW   
 
 
0.0102** 
(2.13) 
0.0022 
(0.45)   
0.0067 
(1.40) 
-0.0017 
(-0.33) 
DCRISIS3*RULE_OF_LAW   
 
 
0.0176** 
(2.42) 
0.0054 
(0.70)   
0.0147** 
(2.01) 
0.0021 
(0.28) 
DCRISIS1*C_RIGHTS   
 
 
0.0050** 
(2.15) 
0.0039* 
(1.65)   
0.0053** 
(2.30) 
0.0042* 
(1.75) 
DCRISIS2*C_RIGHTS   
 
 
-0.0009 
(-0.39) 
0.0006 
(0.24)   
-0.0007 
(-0.30) 
0.0007 
(0.30) 
DCRISIS3*C_RIGHTS   
 
 
0.0051 
(1.55) 
0.0079** 
(2.34)   
0.0053 
(1.63) 
0.0080** 
(2.38) 
DCRISIS1*BANK_CONC   
 
 
0.0490*** 
(3.08) 
0.0490*** 
(3.07)   
0.0454*** 
(2.86) 
0.0450*** 
(2.83) 
DCRISIS2*BANK_CONC   
 
 
0.0815*** 
(4.39) 
0.0817*** 
(4.40)   
0.0767*** 
(4.13) 
0.0768*** 
(4.13) 
DCRISIS3*BANK_CONC   
 
 
0.0564** 
(2.13) 
0.0520* 
(1.95)   
0.0525** 
(1.98) 
0.0480* 
(1.80) 
DCRISIS1*BANK_CREDIT   
 
 
-0.0193** 
(-2.39) 
-0.0394*** 
(-3.26)   
-0.0191** 
(-2.38) 
-0.0415*** 
(-3.42) 
DCRISIS2*BANK_CREDIT   
 
 
-0.0261*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.0589*** 
(-4.69)   
-0.0249*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.0595*** 
(-4.74) 
DCRISIS3*BANK_CREDIT   
 
 
-0.0368*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.0867*** 
(-4.80)   
-0.0364*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.0874*** 
(-4.83) 
DCRISIS1*BOND   
 
 
0.0001 
(1.23) 
0.0001 
(1.49)   
0.0001 
(1.16) 
0.0001 
(1.45) 
DCRISIS2*BOND   
 
 
-0.0000 
(-0.15) 
0.0000 
(0.24)   
-0.0000 
(-0.21) 
0.0000 
(0.19) 
DCRISIS3*BOND   
 
 
-0.0000 
(-0.26) 
-0.0000 
(-0.15)   
-0.0000 
(-0.21) 
-0.0000 
(-0.11) 
DCRISIS1*SIZE   
 
 
 
 
-0.0057** 
(-1.99)   
 
 
-0.0064** 
(-2.24) 
DCRISIS2*SIZE   
 
 
 
 
-0.0036 
(-1.24)   
 
 
-0.0041 
(-1.41) 
DCRISIS3*SIZE   
 
 
 
 
-0.0051 
(-1.25)   
 
 
-0.0056 
(-1.38) 
DCRISIS1*SIZE*BANK_CREDIT   
 
 
 
 
0.0057** 
(2.44)   
 
 
0.0063*** 
(2.69) 
DCRISIS2*SIZE*BANK_CREDIT   
 
 
 
 
0.0086*** 
(3.60)   
 
 
0.0091*** 
(3.81) 
DCRISIS3*SIZE*BANK_CREDIT   
 
 
 
 
0.0123*** 
(3.73)   
 
 
0.0127*** 
(3.84) 
Hausman test 1,386.19*** 1,104.82*** 1,625.50*** 1,722.48*** 1,509.64*** 1,422.26*** 1,602.97*** 1,665.29*** 
F test 44.71*** 23.59*** 13.80*** 13.63*** 41.47*** 22.18*** 13.74*** 13.64*** 
# observations 135,621 101,460 101,460 101,460 135,621 101,460 101,460 101,460 
# firms 27,881 21,595 21,595 21,595 27,881 21,595 21,595 21,595 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test - 5.32*** 5.24*** 6.86*** - 5.94*** 5.10*** 6.89*** 
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Table 8. Debt maturity and intensity of the financial crisis 
Regressions are estimated using panel data. The dependent variable (DEBT_MAT) is the percentage of the firm’s total debt that 
has a maturity of more than one year. ASSET_MAT is the ratio between net fixed assets and total assets. GROWTH is the growth 
rate of the GDP. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. VOL_EBIT is the absolute value of change in earnings before interest and 
taxes. FIRM_QUALITY is the ratio of net income plus depreciation to net debt. LEV is the ratio between total debt and the firm’s 
market value. CRISIS_INTENSITY in columns (1) to (4) is CRISIS_INTENSITY1 and is defined as the difference between the mean GDP 
growth rates for the periods 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 for each country, and zero otherwise. CRISIS_INTENSITY in columns (5) to 
(8) is CRISIS_INTENSITY2 and is the non-performing loans for each country during the period 2008-2012. RULE_OF_LAW is one of 
the six dimensions of the WGI and is a measure of the efficiency of the legal system. C_RIGHTS measures creditor rights. 
BANK_CREDIT is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. BANK_CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three 
largest commercial banks in each country. BOND is the sum of the private bond market capitalization to GDP plus the international 
debt issues to GDP. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null hypothesis that the introduction of instrumental variables has 
no influence on the coefficients of the estimations. We report instrumental variables estimations if the test is significant at the 10 
percent level. Country-year, industry-year and firm-specific effects are included in all the estimations, although we do not report 
their coefficients. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.4447*** (51.33) 
0.4040*** 
(16.16) 
0.4168*** 
(16.05) 
0.4291*** 
(16.38) 
0.4578*** 
(51.20) 
0.3934*** 
(15.73) 
0.4136*** 
(15.04) 
0.4221*** 
(15.27) 
ASSET_MAT 0.0556*** (6.36) 
0.0346*** 
(3.35) 
0.0370*** 
(3.57) 
0.0356*** 
(3.44) 
0.0474*** 
(5.24) 
0.0362*** 
(3.48) 
0.0391*** 
(3.76) 
0.0384*** 
(3.69) 
GROWTH 0.0035*** (6.79) 
0.0034*** 
(5.73) 
0.0033*** 
(5.55) 
0.0033*** 
(5.57) 
0.0031*** 
(5.93) 
0.0033*** 
(5.64) 
0.0033*** 
(5.54) 
0.0033*** 
(5.54) 
SIZE 0.0035** (2.32) 
0.0082*** 
(4.49) 
0.0079*** 
(4.33) 
0.0066*** 
(3.53) 
0.0035** 
(2.24) 
0.0077*** 
(4.24) 
0.0073*** 
(3.97) 
0.0067*** 
(3.64) 
FIRM_QUALITY -0.0009*** (-9.76) 
-0.0008*** 
(-8.02) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.94) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.95) 
-0.0009*** 
(-9.65) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.79) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.68) 
-0.0008*** 
(-7.64) 
VOL_EBIT -0.0002 (-0.86) 
-0.0000 
(-0.08) 
-0.0000 
(-0.09) 
-0.0000 
(-0.11) 
-0.0001 
(-0.56) 
-0.0000 
(-0.09) 
-0.0000 
(-0.08) 
-0.0000 
(-0.13) 
LEV 0.0496*** (9.55) 
0.0630*** 
(10.23) 
0.0657*** 
(10.63) 
0.0659*** 
(10.66) 
0.0568*** 
(10.46) 
0.0653*** 
(10.48) 
0.0666*** 
(10.68) 
0.0680*** 
(10.89) 
CRISIS_INTENSITY -0.2635*** (-3.43) 
-0.2095** 
(-2.29) 
-0.9858*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.8820* 
(-1.69) 
-0.0033*** 
(-6.62) 
-0.0024*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.0072*** 
(-2.82) 
0.0035 
(0.94) 
RULE_OF_LAW - 0.0070 (0.54) 
-0.0018 
(-0.13) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01)  
0.0090 
(0.69) 
0.0069 
(0.52) 
0.0133 
(0.99) 
C_RIGHTS - 0.0186
*** 
(4.56) 
0.0221*** 
(5.23) 
0.0229*** 
(5.38)  
0.0188*** 
(4.63) 
0.0218*** 
(5.13) 
0.0240*** 
(5.61) 
BANK_CONC - 0.0855
*** 
(6.02) 
0.0842*** 
(5.84) 
0.0833*** 
(5.78)  
0.0936*** 
(6.45) 
0.0868*** 
(5.85) 
0.0869*** 
(5.84) 
BANK CREDIT - -0.1354
*** 
(-4.89) 
-0.1423*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.1549*** 
(-5.08)  
-0.1271*** 
(-4.87) 
-0.1484*** 
(-4.90) 
-0.1753*** 
(-5.71) 
BOND  0.0007
*** 
(4.29) 
0.0006*** 
(3.58) 
0.0007*** 
(3.84)  
0.0007*** 
(4.06) 
0.0007*** 
(3.83) 
0.0007*** 
(4.24) 
CRISIS_INTENSITY*RULE_OF_LAW -  0.5501
*** 
(3.72) 
0.3866** 
(2.49)   
0.0031*** 
(2.80) 
0.0005 
(0.41) 
CRISIS_INTENSITY*C_RIGHTS -  0.2027
** 
(2.42) 
0.1876** 
(2.17)   
0.0025*** 
(4.03) 
0.0019*** 
(2.91) 
CRISIS_INTENSITY*BANK_CONC -  1.4830
*** 
(2.88) 
1.7214*** 
(3.32)   
0.0132*** 
(2.90) 
0.0161*** 
(3.54) 
CRISIS_INTENSITY*BANK_CREDIT -  -0.9786
*** 
(-3.78) 
-1.4949*** 
(-4.54)   
-0.0079*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.0194*** 
(-6.86) 
CRISIS_INTENSITY*BOND   -0.0001 (-0.04) 
0.0003 
(0.17)   
-0.0000 
(-0.29) 
0.0000 
(0.73) 
CRISIS_INTENSITY*SIZE -   -0.0663 (-0.75)    
-0.0026*** 
(-4.21) 
CRISIS_INTENSITY*SIZE*BANK_CREDIT -   0.1523
** 
(2.30)    
0.0029*** 
(5.55) 
Hausman test 1,426.92*** 1,045.96*** 1,452.05*** 1,352.55*** 1,321.08*** 1,028.45*** 1,214.44*** 1,264.99*** 
F test 44.18*** 25.75*** 21.27*** 20.06*** 46.28*** 26.06*** 21.17*** 20.89*** 
# observations 135,621 101,460 101,460 101,460 124,877 100,393 100,393 100,393 
# firms 27,881 21,595 21,595 21,595 25,483 21,344 21,344 21,344 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test - 5.70*** 3.19** 3.83*** - 2.48* 2.26* 4.15*** 
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Appendix A. Variables 
The table shows the definition of variables used in the paper and their sources. 
Name Definition Source 
 CRISIS VARIABLES  
DCRISIS A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, and 0 otherwise.  
DCRISIS1 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008 and 2009, and 0 otherwise.  
DCRISIS2 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2010 and 2012, and 0 otherwise.  
DCRISIS3 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the year 2012, and 0 otherwise.  
CRISIS_INTENSITY1 The difference between the mean GDP growth for the period 2003-2007 minus the mean GDP growth for the period 2008-2012 and zero for the remaining years. World Bank 
CRISIS_INTENSITY2 
The percentage of non-performing loans for each country during the period 2008-2012. Bank non-
performing loans to total gross loans are the value of non-performing loans divided by the total value 
of the loan portfolio (including non-performing loans before the deduction of specific loan-loss 
provisions). The loan amount recorded as non-performing should be the gross value of the loan as 
recorded on the balance sheet, not just the amount that is overdue. 
World Bank 
 FIRM-LEVEL VARIABLES  
DEBT_MAT The percentage of the firm’s total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) that has a maturity of more than one year.  Worldscope 
ASSET_MAT The ratio between net fixed assets and total assets. Worldscope 
GROWTH The market-to-book ratio. Worldscope 
SIZE The natural logarithm of sales. Worldscope 
FIRM_QUALITY The ratio of net income plus depreciation to net debt Worldscope 
VOL_EBIT The absolute value of change in earnings before interest and taxes. Worldscope 
LEV The ratio between total debt and the firm’s market value. The market value of assets is defined as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Worldscope 
 COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES  
RULE_OF_LAW 
Rule of law is one of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Rule of law captures 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and, in 
particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
S_RIGHTS 
An indicator of the degree to which private property rights are protected and the degree to which 
government enforces laws that protect private property. It also accounts for the possibility that 
private property may be expropriated and analyses the independence of the judiciary, corruption 
within the judiciary and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. It ranges 
between 0 and 100, a high score indicating greater legal protection of property rights. 
Heritage Foundation 
C_RIGHTS 
This index measures four powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy: (1) whether there are restrictions, 
such as creditor consent, when a debtor files for reorganization; (2) whether secured creditors are 
able to seize their collateral after the petition for reorganization is approved, i.e. whether there is no 
automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by the court; (3) whether secured creditors are paid first out 
of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm; and (4) whether an administrator, and not 
management, is responsible for running the business during the reorganization. A value of one is 
added to the index when a country’s laws and regulations provide each one of these powers to 
secured lenders; it thus varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
BANK_CONC The fraction of bank assets held by the three largest commercial banks in the country. 
Financial Development and 
Structure Dataset (World Bank). 
Beck et al. (2006) 
BANK_CREDIT The ratio of the private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. 
Financial Development and 
Structure Dataset (World Bank). 
Beck et al. (2006) 
BOND The sum of the private bond market capitalization to GDP plus the international debt issues to GDP. 
Financial Development and 
Structure Dataset (World Bank). 
Beck et al. (2006) 
 
